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Questions about the rights of groups or kinds of 
animals, and their moral standing, have traditionally 
appeared in the literature as questions about species 
occurring in nature. l As Passmore has it~ "Does it really 
matter that the moa no longer stalks the New Zealand 
plain?" In those few pieces where the status of 
domesticated species is discussed, however indirectly, 
the questions tend to center around commercial farming 
and arguments for and against vegetarianism, rather than 
the question of the status of domesticated vs. naturally 
occurring species as an issue in itself.2 
In this paper I plan to address the question of the 
moral significance, from the standpoint of animal 
rights, of whether or not a species is domesticated. One 
hesitates to employ the term "species" here, because it 
turns out that what we are really talking about is not, in 
most cases of domesticated animals, the species itself 
but some subgrouping, usually created by humankind, 
frequently termed a breed. In other words, the question 
in its barest form is not whether horses or dogs have a 
moral standing different from that, say of the Bengal 
tiger. Horses and dogs existed before they were 
domesticated, and had they not come into extensive 
contact with people, would no doubt now be viewed by 
us in the same way that we view tigers. What we are 
really talking about, presumably, is the subgroups which 
humans have somewhat laboriously created from the 
original strains of domesticated animals. Dogs and 
horses, with their obvious gradations from St. Bernard 
to Pekingese and from Shire to Welsh pony, are only 
two cases in point. Many persons are surprised to 
discover that sheep, goats, pigs, ducks, geese, and fowl 
all exist in dozens ofdomesticated breeds, each one of 
which has recognizable characteristics, and each one of 
which typically has its own registry. Indeed, the creation 
of such breeds can itself become a viable financial 
enterprise; new registries for horses continually open 
up; and various characteristics are sought after, refined, 
and bred for, even when they first appear as only minor 
variations on the theme of an already existing breed.3 
So, when we ask about the moral significance or 
lack thereof ofdomesticated animals, we are inquiring, 
to reiterate, not about the distinction between the 
standing of an African elephant and a horse, but about 
the distinction, if any, between the status of an African 
elephant and a Shire horse. The crucial difference is, 
of course, that the Shire horse cannot reproduce itself 
in anything like its appropriate form without human 
assistance, since it is not a type of horse which occurs 
in nature. Were humans miraculously to vanish from 
the face of the earth tomorrow (not via nuclear warfare, 
since that, by hypothesis, would result in extreme 
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environmental contamination) elephants would 
continue indefinitely, but Shire horses would not. 
Should we then be concerned about domesticated 
strains of creatures? Given that we have any concern 
at all for Passmore's moa, or for the ostrich, which is 
still here, should we have a similar concern for the 
Shire? I pick the Shire deliberately, since it is a breed 
of draft horse, and draft horses are not needed by 
humans in 1988 in the same way that they once were. 
In the past thirty years or so, the Shire has several times 
neared extinction, and has been rescued as a breed by a 
combination of British and American efforts.4 A great 
deal of time and money has been spent on the Shire, 
the Cleveland Bay, the Suffolk Punch, and even the 
MorganS (although it appears that the Morgan, for one, 
is long since home free); dog breeders are continually 
hearing about the plight of, for example, the Bernese 
Mountain Dog or the Redtick Hound. 
On the face of it, it appears that domesticated breeds 
or subvarieties of species differ from their undomes­
ticated counterparts in two important ways. The first 
and most obvious is that many breeds are ilI-equipped 
for survival without human help. In some cases, 
particularly with certain dog breeds, muscular and 
skeletal changes through extensive and close inbreeding 
have contributed to the make-up of an animal who 
probably could not survive on its own. The dog's natural 
defenses have been virtually bred out In oIher ~, tre 
animal could survive, but only in the sense that a given 
individual might be able to last out the course of its life­
time. Many breeds of horses are notoriously "shy" 
breeders (even outshying the Panda), and it is not clear 
that they would be able to reproduce without human 
intervention. The second major respect in which the 
human-created breeds differ from naturally occurring 
variations or species might be deemed to be a positive 
difference. It is, after all, these very animals who have 
contributed the most to the course of human history 
and culture. When horse breeders remind us of the role 
played by horses in the development of various human 
cultures, they are, after all, not speaking of zebras or 
Przewalski's horse. The horses they are ~g of were 
bred and raised by humans, and many of these horses are 
of the very same breeds now thought to be endangered. 
On the other hand, one might want to note areas of 
similarity between the domestic breeds and non­
domestic animals. Here one wants to say almost imme­
diately that insofar as the characteristics having to do 
with putative moral significance are concerned, 
domesticated breeds are at least on a par with other 
animals. All domesticated creatures are, after all, sentient, 
just as the majority of non-domesticated creatures are, 
with the possible exception, as Singer notes, of molluscs 
and insects.6 Sentiency has widely been held to be the 
basis of the ascription ofrights, or for utilitarian theories, 
the basis for the "taking into consideration" of animals 
and their well-being. Secondly, although it may very 
well be true that. given catastrophe and the absence of 
humans from the planet, Shire horses would revert to 
pre-Shire type, or even refuse to breed at all and die 
out within one generation, all animals, non-domestic 
and domestic, undergo subtle or not so subtle changes 
in mutable characteristics over a period of time. Thus, 
the reversion of most dogs to a mixed, indeterminate, 
pre-breed type without human intervention is simply a 
more dramatic illustration of the slower changes 
undergone, say, by the lion, over a period of time. 
In "Darwin, Species and Morality," Rachels points 
out some respects in which differences between animals 
may not be as helpful in elucidating their moral status 
as one might have thought. What Rachels wants us to 
remember is that differences and distinctions are 
relevant only in specified contexts. Before developing 
this line of thoughtwith regard to questions concerning 
animals, Rachels asks us to think in terms ofdifferences 
between individual persons. PersonAhas higher grades 
and test scores than person B, but that only justifies 
giving A preferential treatment in situations that call 
for analysis along the lines of grades and test scores­
namely, ocademic situations. In another A-B duo, person 
A may be suffering from an infection and B from a 
broken arm, but that only justifies making distinctions 
between them in a medical context'? Rachels goes on 
to talk of the more standard sort of question in animal 
rights, Le., whether or not I can justify my treatment of 
a chimpanzee, for example, by its presumed lesser 
capacity for rationaIity.8 But clearly, this type of 
distinction is relevant to the question we are discussing. 
The differences between domesticated and non­
domesticated species are such that it is hard to see in 
what sorts of morally relevant contexts they would be 
applicable. The fact that a breed is ill-equipped for 
survival without human intervention, or even the 
happier fact that it contributed greatly to the develop­
ment of human culture, does not immediately seem to 
be a morally relevant difference (particularly when we 
recall that the comparison here is between types of 
animals, and not between animals and humans). The 
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fact that domesticated animals are also sentient and that 
their reversion to type is only a speeded-up version of 
general genetic change taking place in all living beings 
may be morally relevant, but those facts serve only to 
place domesticated animals more or less on a par with 
non-domesticated animals. 
I want now to note another important point, also 
borrowed from Rachels' recent work, although with this 
particular point I will have to construct an analogy. 
Rachels' paper as a whole is concerned to argue for 
what he terms "Moral Individualism," meaning that 
we should regard animals, too, as individuals and not 
as typical members of their respective groups. In an 
interesting passage, Rachels notes that a hypothetical 
gifted chimpanzee who had learned to read and speak 
English might still be barred from the classroom by some 
well-meaning persons who contend that, in general, 
chimpanzees are not on a par with humans, and it is the 
group standards which count As Rachels says, 'This chimp 
is not permitted to do something which requires reading, 
despite the fact that he can read, because other chimps 
cannot. That seems not only unfair, but irrational. ,09 
Now, we are not here concerned with Rachels' moral 
individualism, although in general I find his argument 
on that score convincing. But, constructing an analogy, 
I think the following may be said: domesticated animals 
differ from the non-domesticated in ways which are 
analogous to the differences between a very gifted 
chimpanzee and the average wild chimpanzee. 
Domesticated, registered, purebred animals are 
very-may we say?-gifted specimens of their general 
species. They are in many instances specially trained, 
but no training is necessary for many capacities, because 
a large percentage of the traits are inborn. Most horses 
cannot be taught to pace, for example, because it 
involves a form of locomotion which a horse does not 
naturally utilize. But registered Standardbred foals will 
start pacing at one or two days of age. Therefore, 
domesticated animals are not typical of their species, 
and if this specific point is relevant to their moral 
standing in any particular way, it probably speaks in 
their favor, rather than against them. 
One might be inclined to note that the traits which 
these animals have are, of course, traits specifically 
desired by humans, but again, one could move with 
that assertion in either direction. Surely the fact that a 
German short-haired pointer puppy may begin sponta­
IlneouSlY to point at an early age does not count against 
the value of pointers as such, since pointing is merely 
an exaggeration of traits which most dogs possess. One 
hesitates to make this assertion flatfootedly, since the 
counterargument that naturally occurring, untouched 
species are members of the original primeval 
environment ahd hence deserve special consideration 
is strong, but it does not make sense to think that the 
special qualities of domesticated animals make them 
somehow less worth preserving that the moo, the Great 
Auk, or the Indonesian subspecies of rhinoceros. In 
this sense, I think Rachels' general point serves us well. 
Finally, there seems to be a relationship between 
these special characteristics possessed by many breeds 
ofdomesticated animals and the aforementioned hoary 
topic of sentiency, although the relationship may be 
somewhat difficult to articulate. Some breeds, 
particularly ofdogs and horses, seem simply to be more 
sensitive to physical stress and pain than other breeds, 
and certainly than many non-domesticated animals. 
Skin characteristics, shape and length ofcoat, sensitivity 
to physical stimuli, and so forth, may have become so 
altered in the course of refining the breed from the 
original stock that it makes sense to say, in rough terms, 
that the breed possesses more than average sensitivity 
or sentiency. And one can certainly say-although the 
cynical may see this as a topic for humor-that some 
breeds seem to possess an emotional sensitivity as well. 
Stereotypes about small dogs and Thoroughbred and 
Arabian horses are widespread. Again, the inference 
to be made from this information is that, if these 
differences between domesticated breeds or strains and 
non-domesticated types of animals are noted, it would 
seem that these differences count in their favor, not 
against them. 
In the previous paragraphs I have alluded to the 
occurrence of non-domesticated species in the pristine, 
pre-human-intervention environment. This is a topic 
ofsome importance and deserves a fuller treatment than 
I have so far given it. A number of the commentators 
on the general subject ofanimal rights seem to feel that 
arguments for moral consideration of animals break 
down, crudely, into three categories. Regan, in his 
article "Ethical Vegetarianism and Commercial Animal 
Farming," distinguishes between views which we might 
roughly label utilitarian, deontological, and holistl 
environmentalist.1O Viewed cursorily, the utilitarian 
position frequently asks us to take animals into 
consideration morally because they are sentient, or 
because mistreatment of animals might lead to 
mistreatment of humans, so that it is human life which 
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is primarily valued here. A more straightforward 
deontological approach grants animals rights, but then 
the difficulty, as McCloskey has argued, revolves 
around demarcating the line between right-holding 
living things and non-right-holding living things and 
adjudicating disputes, as it were, between animals 
themselves. II Finally, one can give up on the debate 
between the consequentialists and the deontologists and 
simply make the argument that our environment, taken 
as a whole, is worth preserving. Now, when one does 
this, one runs into the sorts of conundra which have 
been parodied by some-the legal standing of trees, 
and so forth. But more salient for our purposes, one is 
back to square one in the contretemps over special 
standing ofdomesticated animals, because domesticated 
animals are paradigm cases of living entities which did 
not naturally occur as part of the environment. 
Unfortunately for the case ofdomesticated animals, 
it probably can be asserted that if one's interest in 
animals stems largely or entirely from an interest in the 
environment as a whole-that is, if one is not much 
more concerned about the California condor than about 
the giant sequoia or even the Grand Canyon-one will 
have comparatively little or no interest in domesticated 
animals. Those preservationally-minded philosophers, 
like Passmore and Rodman,12 who have written on the 
need for new attitudes regarding the Earth and the living 
beings on it have either not dealt with domesticated 
species at all or have written about animals in a way 
that indicates that domesticated species might be given 
short shrift. Passmore, for example, begins his article 
"Preservation" with the following passage: 
By 'preservation' I mean the attempt to main­

tain in their present condition such areas of the
 
earth's surface as do not yet bear the obvious
 
marks of man's handiwork and to protect from
 
the risk of extinction those species of living
 
beings which man has not yet destroyed. 13
 
Passmore goes on to write of the need for preser­
vation due to the intrinsic need of humans for solitude, 
the various sorts of interpretations of the notion of 
preservation which might be given by, say, casual 
campers and vacationers vs. Sierra Club backpackers, 
and the varying criteria for the usefulness of animal 
species in general. Toward the end of his piece 
Passmore discusses in some detail animal rights 
arguments, but only insofar as they concern non-
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domesticated animals, and, interestingly enough, he 
does not think that animal rights arguments themselves 
are very helpful to the preservationist. Passmore ends 
his article by writing of a "shift in sensibility," and he 
continues to write of the need fa valuing the environment 
as a whole.14 John Rodman, in "The Liberation of 
Nature," takes a preservationist stance even more 
foreign to animal rights than Passmore's. Rodman 
seems to think that the animal rights arguments are 
positively harmful, because they send a "double 
message." It is the second half of the double message, 
so to speak, which particularly concerns Rodman; he 
writes that "...non-humans are by the same process 
degraded to the status of inferior human beings, species­
anomalies: imbeciles, the senile, 'human vegetables'­
moral half-breeds having rights without obligations 
(Singer), 'legal incompetents' needing humans to 
interpret and represent their interests in a perpetual 
guardian/ward relationship (Stone)."15 In general, 
Rodman is against the notion ofanimal rights and argues 
strenuously for the development of a new attitude 
toward the natural world. He is also, in general, against 
the enterprise of domestication itself. 
From the foregoing it is possible to glean the 
following: concern for domesticated species or breeds 
will have to come from within the animal rights move­
ment It does not appear to have a natural home within 
the thought of those who take the holistlenvironmentalist 
position with regard to humans and the environment 
Problematically, even within the animal rights move­
ment, it seems difficult to separate a concern for 
domesticated species from a concern for humans. As 
notedearlier,Regan's work lends itselfmost naturally to a 
concern for domesticated species, since so much of his 
material focuses on commercial animal fanning. But 
the difficulty here is that we are not, presumably, 
addressing the same issue. I may wholeheartedly agree 
that the treatment of the Rhode Island Reds used for 
egg-laying and meat consumption purposes is 
inhumane, and I may even become a vegetarian. But 
this is not the same thing as evincing a concern for the 
preservation of the Rhode Island Red as a breed, in 
comparison, say, to the Leghorn, or even, again, to the 
original, non-domesticated Southeast Asia fowl from 
which our domesticated fowl sprang. I may be against 
the consumption of horsemeat in France, the use of 
horsemeat for commercial animal-food purposes here 
in the U.S., against the preparation ofAmerican Saddle­
breds for certain shows by using bellboots, and even 
Between the Species 
Domesticated and Then Some 
against two-year racing ofThoroughbreds, but none of 
these of those positions amounts to a concern over the 
preservation of the American Saddlebred breed as such. 
Thus, I think it is clear that within the framework of 
what has been done so far by philosophers on animal 
rights, only the position which accords animals actual 
rights in the sense that humans have rights (this is the 
position McCloskey, for one, attempts to refute) is at 
all helpful in the delineation of the status of domes­
ticated species vs. non-domesticated species. Insofar 
as that position may be countered-and some of the 
arguments against it are fairly strong16-there is a 
difficulty for both domesticated and non-domesticated 
species, for any account of the rights of domesticated 
species or breeds would have to rest on their 
resemblance to non-domesticated species, as I argued 
at an earlier point Insofar as there might be an argument 
for animal rights which would make characteristics not 
possessed by domesticated animals salient (for example, 
capacity to survive genetically without human 
intervention), it would not be able to encompass rights 
for domesticated animals. Happily, however, I know 
of no views of animal rights which are so stringently 
drawn that they would leave out domesticated animals. 
Indeed, some views, like Rachels' "moral individualism," 
which I mentioned earlier, do not take into account 
group status at all, and this would have the felicitous 
consequence for domesticated animals of rendering 
differences between them and non-domesticated species 
irrelevant from the moral point of view. 
In sum I have argued that if we can accept a view 
of animal rights for non-domesticaled species, there are 
probably no strong reasons for denying the rights to 
domesticated species, both when seen from the 
standpoint of the individual creatures involved and 
when seen from the (more interesting, I believe) 
standpoint of breeds vs. species. Nevertheless, there 
remains in the literature a strong strain that what is most 
valuable about the planet and what is most worth 
preserving is what is least touched by humans. The 
inevitable upshot of the ubiquitousness of this view is 
that many who would be concerned about the 
Indonesian rhinoceros will not be nearly as concerned 
about the Shire. But the question remains, of course, 
whether we are concerned about ourselves. The planet 
as a whole might very well be better off wi thout humans, 
were there some way to remove humans from the planet 
without destroying the environment. But we are 
humans, not beings from another world, and we value 
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human culture. Then, perhaps the strongest counter­
argument to those who insiston theholist/environmen­
talist view to the detriment of domesticated animals is 
that domesticated animals are part of our world, the 
human world, and by extension, worth preserving. 
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